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FOURTH CIRCUIT REVIEW
Title VIII case law. The Fourth Circuit should have employed the
business necessity test to determine the defendant's burden of justifica-
tion.'17 Nevertheless, the Fourth Circuit's decision is significant because
the court extended the Title VII prima facie concept to the area of Title
VIII housing discrimination cases.118 By rejecting previous precedent
that impliedly employed an intent standard in favor of the prima facie
standard in Smith,"9 the Fourth Circuit promoted the congressional
policy that seeks to end racial discrimination by redressing the conse-
quences of discrimination in housing and not simply the motivation
behind such discrimination. "2 ' Under the prima facie standard, plaintiffs
need to demonstrate only that the defendant's housing policies produced
discriminatory effects."' The prima facie standard thereby resolves the
difficulties plaintiffs often encounter in proving specific intent to
discriminate. " ' The Title VIII prima facie standard also ensures that
courts will be able to address the perpetuation of past patterns of racial
discrimination in housing," advancing the congressional goal of achiev-
ing truly integrated living patterns. "4 By employing the Title VIII prima
facie standard in Smith, the Fourth Circuit has provided racial




The Coffey Doctrine Survives Modern Forfeiture Law
Congress may provide both criminal and civil sanctions for the same
act in violation of the law.' Courts may impose death, imprisonment, or a
II? See supra text accompanying notes 82-83 (business necessity test); supra text accom-
panying notes 94-97 (applicability of business necessity test in Smith).
I' See 682 F.2d at 1066-67 (Fourth Circuit applied prima facie standard in Smith); supra
text accompanying notes 15-17 (prima facie standard).
1 See supra note 63 (Fourth Circuit applied intent standard).
121 See supra text accompanying note 21 (purpose of Title VIII is to redress conse-
quences of discrimination).
121 See supra text accompanying notes 15-17 (plaintiff proves prima facie case by show-
ing discriminatory effect).
z See supra note 22 (difficulty in proving specific intent to discriminate).
12 See supra note 22 (many discriminatory effects stem from past patterns of
discrimination).
" See supra text accompanying note 3 (congressional goal of replacing racial segrega-
tion in housing with integrated living patterns).
See, e.g., United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 249-50 (1980) (criminal fine and civil
monetary penalty for oil spill); United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 549 (1943)
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fine for purposes of punishment, deterrence, and retribution in a
criminal trial that affords constitutional safeguards to the defendant.'
The government also may bring a civil action for remedial purposes,
that is, to protect the government from loss and to regulate the public
health and safety.' In a civil trial, sanctions may take the form of
(fraudulent claims against United States punishable by criminal fine up to $10,000, imprison-
ment for two years, civil penalty of double damages and $2000 forfeiture); Helvering v.
Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 399 (1938) (acquitted tax evader liable for fine, imprisonment, and
50% additional income penalty for fraud). The Supreme Court stated that in matters ex-
clusively within Congress' control, Congress has competency to impose obligations and to
sanction enforcement of rules with judicial power and with executive power delegated to ad-
ministrative agencies. 303 U.S. at 399. Congress has imposed both criminal and civil sanctions
on the theory that the legislature may impose penal sanctions to punish wrongdoers and the
government may also resort to the same remedies as a private person for protection of prop-
erty rights. Rex Trailer Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 148, 151 (1956) ($2000 penalty for each
fraudulent claim for surplus property). Congress did not establish more than a single
punishment by allowing courts to impose comprehensive penalties, penal and remedial, for
wrongful acts in separate criminal and civil proceedings. 317 U.S. at 555 (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring). The practice of imposing and enforcing two sanctions for the same misconduct,
one a conventional criminal prosecution and the other a forfeiture proceeding or a civil ac-
tion for a debt, was common when Congress framed the fifth amendment to the Constitu-
tion. Id.; U.S. CONST. amend. V (prohibition against double jeopardy); see infra text accom-
panying notes 11-12, 68-92 (double jeopardy).
2 Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 30-40 (1972); Washington Gas Light Co. v.
Lansden, 172 U.S. 534, 553 (1899). The dominant purposes of punishment are retribution and
deterrence, the desire to reprimand a wrong-doer and to influence the violator's future con-
duct as well as the conduct of others. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 95-96 (1958); H. HART,
PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 4-5 (1968); H. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANC-
TION 31 (1968); Clark, Civil and Criminal Penalties and Forfeitures: A Framework for Con-
stitutional Analysis, 60 MINN. L. REV. 379, 383-84 (1976); Note, Punishment, Its Meaning in
Relation to Separation-of Power and Substantive Constitutional Restrictions and its Use in
the Lovett, Trop, Perez, and Speiser Cases, 34 IND. L. J. 231, 280 (1959) [hereinafter cited as
INDIANA Note]. In the area of public criminal law, the state traditionally and customirily
punished violators by death, imprisonmefit; hard labor, torture or a fine accruing to the
public treasury. INDIANA Note, supra,. at 273. The stigma that accompanies criminal
penalties is distinctive of criminal punishment. Clark, supra, at 413; see Gardiner, The Pur-
poses of Criminal Punishment, 21 MODERN L. R. 117, 123 (1958) (fear of social disapprobation
makes punishment work).
The protections afforded defendants in criminal cases include the right to a public trial,
the right to confront adverse witnesses, the right of compulsory process to obtain witnesses
in the defendant's favor, the right to a jury trial, the right to counsel, the prohibition
against double jeopardy, the right against self-incrimination, the exclusionary rule, and the
right to have the prosecution prove the elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.
See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 28 (1972); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361-62 (1970);
U.S. CONST. amend. IV, V, VI, VII. See generally Charney, The Need for Constitutional Pro-
tections for Defendants in Civil Penalty Cases, 59 CORN. L. REV. 478 (1974) (labelling
criminal monetary penalties "civil" deprives citizens of constitutionat protections afforded
criminal defendants).
' Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 401 (1938); see supra note 1 (civil and criminal
sanctions for same conduct); see, e.g., United States v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 589 F.2d
1305, 1308 (7th Cir. 1978) ($5000 monetary penalty for oil spill); Bramble v. Richardson, 498
F.2d 968, 969 (10th Cir.) (car used to transport marijuana. forfeited), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
[Vol. 40:459
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monetary penalties,4 forfeitures of property,5 or disabilities such as loss
of professional license.' Deprivation of property serves both punitive
1069 (1974); United States v. Gramer, 191 F.2d 741, 744 (9th Cir. 1951) (forfeiture of
misbranded drugs). Accepted judicial rules and constitutional safeguards of criminal trials
are incompatible with civil procedure and do not apply in civil proceedings. 303 U.S. at 402
(50% addition to tax collectible by civil distraint and also by court proceeding). Never-
theless, the Supreme Court has granted limited constitutional safeguards to defendants in
quasi-criminal civil proceedings, for example, when the defendant is subject to civil
penalties because of criminal offenses the defendant committed. See One 1958 Plymouth
Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693, 700-01 (1965) (contraband seized in violation of the
fourth amendment excluded from evidence); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634 (1886)
(statutory forfeiture of goods entitled owner to protection of self-incrimination clause of
fifth amendment). When the Supreme Court finds that a civil penalty only punishes a defend-
ant and has no remedial or regulatory purpose, the safeguards of a criminal proceeding apply.
Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 165 (1963) (deprivation of nationality, without
procedural safeguards of fifth and sixth amendments, for offense of leaving or remaining
outside United States to evade military duty invalid).
See, e.g., Rex Trailer Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 148, 148-52 (1956) ($2000 penalty
for each false claim for surplus property); United States v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 589 F.2d
1305, 1308 (7th Cir. 1978) ($5000 penalty for oil spill); Olhausen v. Commissioner, 273 F.2d 23,
27 (9th Cir.) (imposing additional income tax for failure to file statement of estimated tax),
cert. denied, 363 U.S. 820 (1960); United States v. Cato Bros., Inc., 175 F. Supp. 811, 814
(E.D. Va.) (monetary penalty of $29,000 imposed for false claims of cotton dealers), rev'd on
other grounds, 273 F.2d 153 (4th Cir. 1959).
1 See Compton v. United States, 377 F.2d 408, 409 (8th Cir. 1967) (civil action against
truck used in unlawful transportation of untaxed whiskey). A forfeiture is an action against
property and is called an in rem action. Various Items of Personal Property v. United
States, 282 U.S. 577, 580 (1931). In contrast, an action against a person is an in personam ac-
tion. Id. Historically, the law based forfeiture upon deodand, a legal doctrine decreeing
forfeiture to the Crown of England of an animate or inanimate object causing a person's
death. Goldsmith-Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 505, 510-11 (1921) (recognizing
analogy of forfeiture to deodand); see 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *301; 0. HOLMES,
THE COMMON LAW 1-38 (1938). A forfeiture may proceed whether or not a criminal action is
prosecuted. See, e.g., United States v. Eighty-Six Firearms, and 22 Rounds of Ammunition,
623 F.2d 643, 644 (10th Cir. 1980); Bramble v. Richardson, 498 F.2d 968, 969 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 1069 (1974). A forfeiture may proceed before or after a criminal action. See,
e.g., United States v. One 1975 Chevrolet K-5 Blazer, 495 F. Supp. 737, 741-42 (W.D. Mich.
1980) (criminal conviction works estoppel in favor of government in forfeiture proceeding);
Glup v. United States, 523 F.2d 557, 561 (8th Cir. 1975) (defendant acquitted on criminal
charges after forfeiture proceeding). Since the issue before the court is whether or not the
inanimate object participated in criminal activity, the guilt or innocence of the owner is ir-
relevant. Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 686 (1974) (forfeiture of
$22,000 yacht transporting marijuana). The Fourth Circuit considers the notion of an action
against property itself a fiction because confiscation obviously is harsh to the owner. United
States v. Two Barrels of Whiskey, 96 F. 479, 481 (4th Cir. 1899) (rejecting the legal fiction).
See generally Charney, supra note 2 (owners of forfeited property have limited constitu-
tional rights); Smith, Modern Forfeiture Law and Policy: A Proposalfor Reform, 19 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 661 (1978) (in rem fiction no longer tenable); Note, Forfeitures- Civil or
Criminal? 43 TEMP. L.Q. 191 (1970) (punitive effects of forfeitures) [hereinafter cited as
TEMPLE Note].
' See Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S. 189, 200 (1898) (delicensure of doctor convicted of
crime); see also Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 620 (1960) (cancellation of social security
benefits); Lewis v. Frick, 233 U.S. 291, 302 (1914) (deportation of aliens); Standlee v. Rhay,
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and remedial ends,' but unlike monetary loss that can occur in the
criminal and the civil context,8 property forfeiture occurs only in civil
proceedings.' The punitive or remedial nature of a property forfeiture in
a civil action is, however, determinative of constitutional protections af-
forded the property owner."
557 F.2d 1303, 1306 (9th Cir. 1977) (revocation of parole). Cf. Murphy v. United States, 272
U.S. 630, 631-32 (1926 (civil action to abate nuisance for future prevention, thus, remedial
not punitive).
Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 685-87 (1974). Disregarding
the owner's innocence and the sanction's severity, in Calero-Toledo the Supreme Court
acknowledged the punitive and deterrent purposes of a Puerto Rican law that prescribed
forfeiture of a $20,000 yacht leased to an occupant who possessed a single marijuana
cigarette. Id. at 668, 680-88. The Court validated the civil penalty as an in rem forfeiture
proceeding that prevents further illicit use of the conveyance, imposes an economic penalty
making illegal behavior unprofitable, and compensates the government for its enforcement
efforts. Id. at 686-87; see supra note 76 (contraband per se).
The Supreme Court has said that a property forfeiture does not punish the owner
because the government proceeds against the property. Various Items of Personal Property
v. United States, 282 U.S. 577, 581 (1931) (forfeiture of smuggled items). Contra Coffey v.
United States, 116 U.S. 436, 443 (1886) (forfeiture of distillery apparatus punitive to owner);
United States v. One 1956 Ford Fairlane Tudor Sedan, 272 F.2d 704, 705 (10th Cir. 1959)
(despite forfeiture proceeding, confiscation of automobile allegedly used for transportation
of sugar intended for use in unlawful manufacture of distilled spirits punished owner). In tax
collection cases, the Supreme Court has held that a 50%h penalty tax for fraud is remedial
because the penalty compensates the government for enforcement expenses. Helvering v.
Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 401 (1938). Imposition of 100% tax addition for noncompliance with
prohibition laws, however, was a punitive sanction. Lipke v. Lederer, 259 U.S. 557, 562
(1922); see Clark, supra note 2, at 476-81 (distinguishing between punitive and regulatory
sanctions); Levin, OSHA and the Sixth Amendment: When is a "Civil" Penalty Criminal in
Effect?, 5 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1013, 1034-35 (1978) (analyzing remedial and punitive
nature of civil penalties).
' United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 250-51 (1980) (monetary penalty for oil spill
remedial and criminal fine punitive). In United States v. Ward, the Tenth Circuit held that
the monetary penalty imposed for causing an oil spill was so punitive that the penalty
became a criminal penalty. Id. at 247-48; see Ward v. Coleman, 598 F.2d 1187, 1196 (10th Cir.
1979). The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the creation of a monetary fund for the
purpose of removal of oil was a remedial sanction. Id. at 244, 248. In United States ex rel
Marcus v. Hess, the defendants defrauded the United States by collusive bidding on con-
tracts. 317 U.S. 537, 539 (1943). The criminal statute imposed a fine of up to $10,000. Id. at
548. Under the criminal statute, a court could sentence a convicted defendant to prison for
failure to pay the fine. Id. Additionally, Congress provided for collection of double the
damages the government sustained because of the fraud and the additional sum of $2000 for
each violation. Id. at 540. The Supreme Court has stated that from a constitutional stand-
point, a defendant who forfeits a sum of money is no different from one who pays that sum
as a criminal fine imposed for the same course of conduct. United States v. United States
Coin & Currency, 401 U.S. 715, 718 (1971).
' See supra note 5 (forfeiture proceeding against property, not persons); see, e.g.,
United States v. Two Hundred Fifty-Four United States Twenty Dollar Gold Coins, 355 F.
Supp. 298, 302 (E.D. Mich. 1973) (forfeiture of coins reimbursed government for investiga-
tion expenses, rather than punished defendant); United States v. 38 Cases, 99 F. Supp. 460,
463-64 (S.D.N.Y. 1951) (libel to condemn misbranded and adulterated food to protect public
health and prevent deception of the purchasing public).
10 Compare One Lot Emerald Cut Stones and One Ring v. United States, 409 U.S. 232,
235 (1972) (administrative forfeiture of goods undeclared to customs is civil remedial sane-
[Vol. 40:459
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The double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment to the United
States Constitution prohibits successive criminal punishments for the
same offense.1 In Ashe v. Swenson,12 the Supreme Court held that the
double jeopardy clause embodied collateral estoppel, a rule of federal
law in civil and criminal cases that precludes relitigation of an issue
determined by a final judgment in a prior trial."3 Thus, once the trier of
tion not barred by prior acquittal of defendant for smuggling) with Coffey v. United States,
116 U.S. 436, 443 (1886) (double jeopardy bar to punitive forfeiture of distillery equipment
following defendant's acquittal of unlicensed liquor manufacturing); see infra text accompa-
nying notes 29-34 (Coffey discussion) & 40-45 (One Lot discussion). Classification of a statute
as nonpenal does not alter the fundamental nature of a plainly penal statute. United States
v. Constantine, 296 U.S. 287, 294 (1935) ($1000 excise tax for violation of state liquor law ac-
tually penalty because to collect government must show conduct of defendant evidence of
crime); see Charney, supra note 2, at 491-506 (attempt to distinguish criminal from civil
penalties); Clark, supra note 2, at 475-81 (Supreme Court's ambivalence in holding
forfeitures punitive or remedial); supra notes 2-3 (safeguards for criminal and civil pro-
ceedings); infra note 79 and accompanying text (characterization of statute not determinative
of punitive or remedial nature).
" Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 398 (1938); see U.S. CONST. amend. V (no person
to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb). The double jeopardy clause provides that a court
can neither try nor punish a person a second time for the same offense. Green v. United
States, 355 U.S. 184, 190 (1957) (acquittal on charge of second degree murder bars subse-
quent prosecution for first degree murder); In re Snow, 120 U.S. 274, 285 (1887) (conviction
bars subsequent prosecution for same offense); see generally M. FRIEDLAND, DOUBLE
JEOPARDY 197 (1969) (double jeopardy treatise). Double jeopardy does not bar a civil trial
subsequent to a criminal trial for the same conduct because under the traditional division of
civil and criminal procedure, each proceeding is a separate cause of action. United States v.
Mumford, 630 F.2d 1023, 1027 (4th Cir.) (civil injunction and criminal trial), cert. denied, 430
U.S. 401 (1980); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS, § 85, comment a (1981). The law does
not provide an opportunity for joinder of a civil claim and a criminal claim in one pro-
ceeding. 18 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, § 4474 (1981)
[hereinafter cited as WRIGHT & MILLER]. The additional burdens upon the government in a
criminal trial such as limited discovery and lack of appeal of an acquittal would place undue
burdens upon the plaintiff in a civil trial. Neaderland v. Commissioner, 424 F.2d 639, 641 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 827 (1970); see supra note 2 (constitutional safeguards of criminal
trial). A civil action between private parties following a criminal action or a criminal defend-
ant's action against the government are different causes of action and do not raise the prob-
lem of collateral estoppel. WRIGHT, supra, at § 4474. Even when the government appears as
plaintiff in the civil action, the government's claim as a private party seeking compensation
is different from the government's action to vindicate public justice in a criminal trial. Id.;
see 1 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.41813] (2d ed. 1982); Vestal & Coughenour, Preclu-
sion/Res Judicata Variables: Criminal Prosecutions, 19 VAND. L. REV. 683, 702-16 (1966)
[hereinafter cited as Vestal & Coughenour]; supra note 1 (government enforces penal sanc-
tions and protects property rights of government).
Is Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970). In Ashe v. Swenson, a grand jury indicted
Ashe separately for the robbery of six individuals at one poker game. Id. at 438. A jury in
the criminal trial acquitted Ashe, determining that Ashe was not the robber. Id. at 439. On
habeas corpus review, the Supreme Court held that principles of collateral estoppel barred
subsequent prosecution of Ashe for robbing the other players because the issue of the rob-
ber's identity was determined against the government in the first trial. Id. at 439-40, 446;
see infra note 13 (collateral estoppel).
Is 397 U.S. 436, 443; United States v. Oppenheimer, 242 U.S. 85, 88 (1916). Collateral
estoppel means that once the trier of fact has determined an issue of ultimate fact that has
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fact adjudicates a disputed issue, the state cannot bring the defendant
before a new judge or jury to relitigate the issue without violating the
double jeopardy clause. 4 In United States v. One Assortment of 89
Firearms," the Fourth Circuit barred a civil forfeiture action instituted
after a judgment of acquittal on a related criminal offense. 6 The 89
Firearms court held that the civil forfeiture was a punitive sanction, and
thus, that the doctrine of collateral estoppel precluded relitigation of
issues that the criminal jury had decided against the government in the
prior trial."
In 89 Firearms, the United States of America seized an assortment
of firearms at the home of the defendant pursuant to a search
warrant. 8 A grand jury indicted the defendant on the criminal charge
of engaging in the business of dealing in firearms without a license, a
violation of section 922(a) of the Gun Control Act of 1968 (Act).9 The
defendant raised the defense of entrapment." A jury found the defen-
become a valid and final judgment, the same parties cannot litigate the issue again in a
future lawsuit. 397 U.S. at 443. Double jeopardy evaluates the similarity of the two offenses
or causes of action and precludes successive trials when the offenses are the same. Brown v.
Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 166 (1977) (double jeopardy clause bars prosecution for automobile theft
after conviction for lesser included offense of operating same vehicle without owner's con-
sent); Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 303-04 (1932) (sale of narcotics not in
original stamped package and sale of same narcotics not pursuant to written order, two
distinct offenses); see supra note 11 (double jeopardy). Collateral estoppel pertains to the
specific issues litigated. Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351, 353 (1876). The Cromwell
Court noted that when actions are upon different claims, the judgment in the prior action
operates as an estoppel only concerning those matters in issue on controverted points that
the trier of fact determined. Id.; see Sealfon v. United States, 332 U.S. 575, 580 (1948) (ac-
quittal on conspiracy no bar to subsequent prosecution on related offense).
" Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 446 (1970); see supra notes 11 & 13 (double jeopardy
and collateral estoppel protections).
" 685 F.2d 913 (4th Cir. 1982) (5-4 decision), aff'g on rehearing, 669 F.2d 206 (4th Cir.
1982), petition for cert. filed, 51 U.S.L.W. 3558 (Dec. 20, 1982) (No. 82-1047).
16 685 F.2d at 914, 918.
Id. at 916.
'8 Id. at 914.
19 Id. Chapter 44 of the Criminal Code of the United States concerning Firearms is
popularly known as the Gun Control Act of 1968 (the Act). Id. at 10; 18 U.S.C. §§ 921-928
(1976). Under § 922(a)(1) of the Act (§ 922(a)(1)) only a licensed dealer may engage in the
business of dealing in firearms or ammunition or may receive any firearm in the course of
such business. 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(1) (1976). Under § 924(a) of the Act any person who violates
Chapter 44 is subject to a fine of not more than $5,000 or imprisonment for not more than
five years or both. Id. § 924(a).
' 685 F.2d at 918-19 (Winter, C.J., dissenting). Entrapment occurs when the criminal
design originates with the officers of the government who implant in the mind of an inno-
cent person the disposition to commit the alleged offense and induce commission of the
crime so that they may prosecute. Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 372 (1958); see
Crisp v. United States 262 F.2d 68, 69 (4th Cir. 1958). Entrapment occurs only when the
criminal conduct is the product of the creative activity of law enforcement officials. 356 U.S.
at 372; see 262 F.2d at 69; Newman v. United States, 299 F. 128, 131 (4th Cir. 1924). Under
federal law, the defendant can raise the defense of entrapment without admitting the
criminal act. United States v. Shameia, 464 F.2d 629, 630 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
[Vol. 40:459
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dant not guilty." Subsequently, the government instituted an in rem
forfeiture proceeding" to confiscate the seized firearms pursuant to
section 924(d) of the Act." The District Court of South Carolina found
that the defendant used the firearms in violation of the Act, and
therefore ordered forfeiture. 4 The defendant, seeking to reclaim the
firearms, appealed to the Fourth Circuit. 5 As a defense to the civil
forfeiture action, the defendant argued that the prior jury verdict con-
clusively determined that he was not engaged in the business of dealing
in firearms without a license, and, therefore, could not have used the
seized firearms in such a business." Consequently, the defendant con-
tended that the government should be estopped from relitigating the
same issue against the defendant.' The Fourth Circuit sustained the
defendant's collateral estoppel theory and reversed the decision of the
lower court. 8
In reversing the district court decision, the Fourth Circuit relied
upon the Supreme Court's decision in Coffey v. United States." In Cof-
fey, the Court barred a civil forfeiture action to confiscate distillery
equipment and apparatus.2 The forfeiture in Coffey was an in rem pro-
ceeding against the property used in the operation of a distillery without
payment of taxes required by the Internal Revenue laws." Prior to the
civil suit, a jury in a criminal trial had determined that the defendant
was not guilty of operating a distillery without payment of taxes.2 2 The
Coffey Court barred the civil proceeding because the factual basis of the
1076 (1972). Establishment of entrapment entitles the defendant to acquittal. Sherman v.
United States, 356 U.S. at 377; see infra note 51 (entrapment negates intent).
2 685 F.2d at 914; see United States v. Mulcahey, Criminal No. 77-0013 (D.S.C. Mar.
16, 1977). Mulcahey made three sales of firearms at his residence to an agent of the Bureau
of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms. Brief for Appellee at 13, 685 F.2d 913 (4th Cir. 1982)
[hereinafter cited as Appellee Brief]. The defendant purchased nine firearms and acquired
12 stolen firearms following expiration of his dealer's license on March 27, 1975. Id. at 5,
13-14.
See supra note 5 (forfeiture is action against property, not persons).
685 F.2d at 914; United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 511 F. Supp. 133,
134 (D.S.C. 1980), rev'd, 669 F.2d 206 (4th Cir.), affd on reheaing, 685 F.2d 913 (1982). Sec-
tion 924 provides penalties for violations of the Gun Control Act, Chapter 44 of the Criminal
Code. 18 U.S.C. § 924 (1976). Under § 924(d) of the Act (§ 924(d)) any firearm or ammunition
involved in or used in or intended to be used in any violation of Chapter 44, Firearms, is sub-
ject to seizure and forfeiture. 18 U.S.C. § 924(d).
24 511 F. Supp. 133, 139 (D.S.C. 1980).
685 F.2d at 914.
Id. at 915.
'Id.
Id. at 916, 918.
Id. at 915; see Coffey v. United States, 116 U.S. 436, 443 (1886) (acquittal on charge of
operating distillery without a license barred suit against distillery equipment).
Coffey v. United States, 116 U.S. 436, 445 (1886.
Id. at 439. In Coffey, the trial court entered an order condemning the property as
forfeited to the United States. Id.
Id. at 440. In Coffey, the government filed charges against the defendant for three
1983]
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civil action was identical to the factual basis of the criminal offense.'
The Court held that the judgment of acquittal in favor of Coffey was con-
clusive and, in addition, that the sole purpose of the forfeiture was
punishment.' The Fourth Circuit found the facts of 89 Firearms and Cof-
fey parallel because in each case the government had to prove the ex-
istence of an unlicensed business to condemn the property. 5 The Fourth
Circuit also decided that the forfeiture statute imposed punishment as-a
consequence of unlicensed dealing. 6 The Fourth Circuit, therefore, held
that the verdict in the criminal case in 89 Firearms collaterally estopped
the government from instituting the forfeiture. 7
The dissent in 89 Firearms argued that One Lot Emerald Cut Stones
and One Ring v. United States' should control the firearms forfeiture
decision. 9 In One Lot, the Supreme Court ruled that a judgment of ac-
quittal in a prior criminal trial for smuggling goods into the United
States did not bar a subsequent forfeiture proceeding against
undeclared k goods."0 The One Lot Court held that the forfeiture of
counts of attempting to defraud the United States of taxes on distilled spirits while he was
engaged in the business of a distiller. Id.
Id. at 443.
3 Id.
' 685 F.2d at 915-17. To support a conviction under § 922(a) of the Gun Control Act,
the government in 89 Firearms had to prove that the defendant engaged in the business of
dealing in firearms between certain dates and that he was not a licensed dealer. Id. at 916-17;
see 18 U.S.C. § 922(a) (1976). The government had to prove the same essential elements in
the forfeiture action. 685 F.2d at 917; see'18 U.S.C. § 924(d) (1976). The government intro-
duced the same firearmes into evidence in the civil and the criminal trial. Id. The govern-
ment admitted that identical factual issues had to be proved in both trials but argued that
the difference in the burdens of proof between a civil and a criminal proceeding precluded
collateral estoppel. Appellee Brief, supra note 21, at 27-28; see infra text accompanying
notes 52-67 (burden of proof disregarded when forfeiture punitive); infra text accompanying
notes 48-51 (89 Firearms dissent asserts additional element of intent in forfeiture statute).
" 685 F.2d at 917-18; see infra text accompanying notes 68-92 (forfeiture statute in 89
Firearms punitive in nature); supra text accompanying notes 11-14 (double jeopardy col-
lateral estoppel).
685 F.2d at 917.
409 U.S. 232 (1972).
United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 669 F.2d 206, 211 (4th Cir.)
(Winter, C.J., dissenting), aff'd on rehearing, 685 F.2d 913 (1982).
0 One Lot Emerald Cut Stones and One Ring v. United States, 409 U.S. 232, 237 (1972).
In One Lot, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Fifth Circuit not to bar a
forfeiture of undeclared goods under § 1497 of the Tariff Act following a criminal verdict of
acquittal on the smuggling charge. Id.; see One Lot Emerald Cut Stones and One Ring v.
United States, 461 F.2d 1189, 1192 (5th Cir. 1972); 19 U.S.C. § 1497 (1976). The government
unsuccessfully prosecuted the defendant for smuggling under § 545 of the Criminal Code.
409 U.S. at 232; see 18 U.S.C. § 545 (1976). The government then instituted a statutory
forfeiture action under both § 545 and § 1497. 409 U.S. at 233; see 18 U.S.C. § 545 (1976)
(merchandise recovered from any person smuggling subject to forfeiture); 19 U.S.C. § 1497
(1976) (any article not included in customs declaration subject to forfeiture). Section 545 of
the Criminal Code provides that any person who smuggles merchandise shall be fined or im-
[Vol. 40:459
FOURTH CIRCUIT REVIEW
undeclared goods was remedial in nature and rejected the double jeopardy
argument.4' The Court described the remedial effect of the forfeiture in
terms of preventing the circulation of forbidden merchandise and reim-
bursing the government for the expense of regulation.42 The One Lot
Court refused to apply collateral estoppel because the element of
criminal intent in the offense of smuggling defined by the Tariff Act of
1930 (Tariff Act) was not an element of the forfeiture proceeding. 3 In a
footnote, the One Lot Court specifically distinguished Coffey from One
Lot because of the element of intent.44 The One Lot Court also stated
that the difference in the burdens of proof in the two proceedings did not
permit application of collateral estoppel.4
prisoned and that merchandise recovered from a smuggler shall be subject to forfeiture. 18
U.S.C. § 545 (1976). Section 1497 of the Tariff Act of 1930 provides that any article not in-
cluded in a customs declaration shall be subject to forfeiture. 19 U.S.C. § 1497 (1976).
In considering the forfeiture pursuant to § 545, the trial court in One Lot held that the
acquittal on the criminal charge of smuggling barred the forfeiture proceeding based on Cof-
fey v. United States and United States v. Rosenthal. One Lot, 461 F.2d 1189, 1190-91 (5th
Cir. 1972); see Coffey v. United States, 116 U.S. 436, 443 (1886) (discussed supra notes 30-35);
United States v. Rosenthal, 174 F. 652, 653 (5th Cir. 1909) (per curiam) (verdict for defendants
indicted for smuggling barred libel by United States for forfeiture of goods). The Fifth Cir-
cuit in One Lot agreed with the disposition of the trial court as to the § 545 forfeiture, but
held that the § 1497 forfeiture could proceed because § 1497 did not require the government
to prove any crime. 461 F.2d at 1191. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Fifth
Circuit allowing the forfeiture under § 1497 and did not disturb the ruling on § 545. 409 U.S.
at 233 n.3.
" 409 U.S. at 234-36.
42 Id. at 237; see supra notes 1 & 8 (remedial penalties compensate government for loss
and protect public health and safety).
0 409 U.S. at 234. To succeed in a forfeiture under § 1497 of the Tariff Act, the
Supreme Court in One Lot stated that the government had to prove only that the property
entered the United States without the required declaration. Id. In a § 1497 action, the
government bears no burden with respect to intent. Id. To secure a conviction under § 545
of the Criminal Code, however, the government must prove the physical act of importation
and the knowing and wilful intent of the defendant to defraud the United States. Id.
" 409 U.S. at 237 n.5. Accord United States v. Kismetoglu, 476 F.2d 269, 270 (9th Cir.)
(reversing opinion based on erroneous ruling in United States v. One 1967 Cadillac El
Dorado, 453 F.2d 396, 396 (9th Cir. 1971) (Coffey bars customs forfeiture)), cert. dismissed,
410 U.S. 976 (1973).
"3 409 U.S. at 235. The due process clause of the United States Constitution requires
that the prosecution in a criminal proceeding prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. In re
Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970); see U.S. CONST. amend. V. In a suit to enforce civil
penalties, the standard of proof is a preponderance of the evidence. Lilienthal's Tobacco v.
United States, 97 U.S. 237, 272 (1877); Compton v. United States, 377 F.2d 408, 411 (8th Cir.
1967). Since the Constitution requires a higher burden of proof in criminal trials because the
defendant is exposed to punishment, the doctrine of collateral estoppel should not apply be-
tween civil and criminal actions. Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 397 (1938). Although
the prosecution may be unable to prove a fact beyond a reasonable doubt in a criminal trial,
the government successfully may prove the fact under the lighter burden of preponderance
of the evidence in a civil trial. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 11, at 757-58. Cf. United States
v. Burns, 103 F. Supp. 690, 694 (D. Md.) despite wife's acquittal of husband's murder, subse-
quent civil proceeding for insurance proceeds held wife murdered husband), affd, 200 F.2d
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Collateral estoppel barred the civil forfeiture action in 89 Firearms
because the government litigated the same elements under the criminal
statute and the forfeiture statute.4 6 The Fourth Circuit majority held
that, because the jury resolved the same issues in the prior criminal trial
against the government, the One Lot analysis did not apply in 89
Firearms." The 89 Firearms dissent, however, asserted that the civil
forfeiture statute is broad enough to require forfeiture of firearms even
when the defendant does not violate the Gun Control Act."8 In the dis-
sent's analysis, section 924(d) sanctions an intention to violate the Act
with a gun as well as an intention to use a gun in a completed violation of
the Act. 9 Under this construction, One Lot would control 89 Firearms
106 (4th Cir. 1952). Following a criminal conviction, courts have justified application of col-
lateral estoppel to preclude relitigation of the issue of guilt in civil actions because the
government has met the higher burden of proof. Vestal & Coughenour, supra note 11 at
699-701; see, e.g., Local 167, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 291 U.S. 293, 298
(1934) (criminal conviction of defendants for conspiracy precluded denial of guilt in civil in-
junctive suit for Sherman Act violation); Moore v. United States, 360 F.2d 353, 357-58, 16
A.F.T.R.2d 6058, 6061 (4th Cir.) (husband convicted of wilful tax evasion estopped from deny-
ing guilt of fraud; but wife, not a party, could relitigate), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1001 (1965);
Berdick v. United States, 612 F.2d 533, 537-38 (Ct. Cl. 1979) (conviction of making false
statements on medicare forms estopped defendant's plea of not guilty in civil suit for double
damages). Collateral estoppel, however, does not apply to a judgment of acquittal in a prior
trial because an acquittal merely shows that the prosecution failed to prove guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt. Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 397 (1938); see Note, Civil Pro-
cedure- The Admissibility of Criminal Convictions as Collateral Estoppel in Subsequent
Civil Actions, 13 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 459, 459-63 (1977).
" 685 F.2d at 915, 916-17; see supra note 35 (elements of § 922(a) and § 924(d) of the
Gun Control Act).
, 685 F.2d at 916-17.
685 F.2d at 918-19 (Winter, C.J., dissenting).
"' Id. at 919. The 89 Firearms dissent stated that under § 922 of the Gun Control Act
only the completed act of engaging in the business of dealing in firearms without a license is
illegal. Id. Section 922(a) does not define the intention to engage in unlicensed dealing as a
crime. Id. The dissent asserted that § 924(d) encompasses the act of intending to engage in
unlicensed dealing. Id. at 919 note *. The completed act of using a gun or violating the Gun
Control Act is not necessary. Id. at 919; accord United States v. One Assortment of Seven
Firearms, 632 F.2d 1276, 1279 (5th Cir. 1980). In Seven Firearms, the district court required
an underlying statutory firearms violation to justify the forfeiture under § 924(d). Id. at
1278. The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court decision and held that a court may order
forfeiture when the government shows and the court finds intent to violate § 922 of the Gun
Control Act. Id. at 1279.
Courts traditionally have held that § 924(d) requires an act of actual sale or exhibition
of a firearm for sale. See United States v. One Assortment of 12 Rifles and 21 Handguns,
313 F. Supp. 641, 641-42 (N.D. Fla. 1970) (circumstantial evidence together with direct
testimony of government agent who purchased various guns established by a
preponderance of the evidence that intervenor involved firearms'or intended to use
firearms in violation of Gun Control Act). Section 924(d) allows forfeiture of firearms poten-
tially available to the defendant at the time of the completed violation. United States v.
1,922 Assorted Firearms and 229,533 Rounds of Assorted Ammunition, 330 F. Supp. 635,
642 (E.D. Mo. 1971) (four sales of firearms not justify court's finding that unlicensed dealer
intended to use entire inventory in violation of the law). In the original 89 Firearms action,
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because the elements of the criminal statute and the elements of the
forfeiture statute would not be identical. The dissent's position,
however, should not have prevailed in 89 Firearms because the govern-
ment based the forfeiture entirely upon proof of the completed criminal
offense on a preponderance of the evidence standard. 1
The 89 Firearms majority relied upon the statement in One Lot that
collateral estoppel would bar forfeiture if the jury in the earlier criminal
trial had resolved the identical issues in dispute in the forfeiture action.2
the district court's order did not apply to some of the seized firearms because the govern-
ment did not present evidence that the defendant stored or offered for sale or used a small
number of the seized firearms in the forfeitable offense. Appellee Brief, supra note 21, at 11.
The government is not required to show the element of scienter in a civil action for
forfeiture of firearms under § 924(d) of the Gun Control Act. United States v. 57
Miscellaneous Firearms, 422 F. Supp. 1066, 1070 (W.D. Mo. 1976). Thus, lack of specific in-
tent to break the law by selling firearms without a license is no defense to a forfeiture
charge. Id.
The 89 Firearms dissent also argued that the jury may not have decided conclusively
whether the defendant was engaged in unlicensed dealing because the defendant raised the
defense of entrapment. 685 F.2d at 918-19 (Winter, C.J., dissenting). The majority made no
response to the argument of entrapment. If the jury did accept the entrapment defense,
federal law required the jury to find that law enforcement officers induced the defendant to
engage in unlicensed dealing. See supra note 20 (entrapment defined). In that situation, the
parties did litigate the factual basis of the forfeiture and the jury found that the acts of the
defendant did not constitute a violation through the defendant's own initiative. Id. The jury
finding that government officials induced the defendant to deal in firearms would negate
any intention on the part of the defendant to violate the Act. Id. As long as the defendant
does not raise the defense of entrapment successfully in an initial criminal trial, the govern-
ment should be able to bring a forfeiture action following an acquittal on the basis that the
element of intent in the forfeiture is not an element of the criminal offense. See One Lot
Emerald Cut Stones and One Ring v. United States, 409 U.S. 232, 234 (1972).
1 685 F.2d at 919 note * (Winter, C.J., dissenting). The 89 Firearms dissent said that
the parties did not litigate the question of whether the defendant intended to use the
firearms he possessed in violation of the statute. Id.; see supra text at note 44 (element of
criminal intent not in One Lot forfeiture).
"' See Appellee Brief, supra note 21, at 18. The government in 89 Firearms argued
that a violation of § 924(d) of the Gun Control Act requires proof of "dealing" under the
criminal section of § 922(a)(1) and that the evidence in the forfeiture action was sufficient to
convict under § 922(a)(1). Id. at 18-20. In a criminal trial in which the more stringent burden
of proof beyond a reasonable doubt applies, the government may satisfy its burden of prov-
ing the status of the defendant as a "dealer" in firearms under § 922 by showing that the
defendant had guns on hand or was ready and able to procure and sell them to persons who
might purchase the guns as customers. United States v. Masters, 622 F.2d 83, 88 (4th Cir.
1980). In 89 Firearms, the government argued that testimony that the defendant purchased
six rifles at a good price knowing of three friends who each wanted rifles was sufficient to
satisfy the preponderance of the evidence standard, thereby proving the defendant was a
dealer. Appellee Brief, supra note 21, at 15. Evidence of numerous sales of or offers to sell
certain firearms in specified time periods to strangers constitute proof of dealing under
§ 922(a). Id. at 16. The government in 89 Firearms asserted that, although the burden in the
forfeiture was a preponderance of the evidence, the facts were sufficient to meet the
reasonable doubt standard. Id.
" 685 F.2d at 916. The One Lot Court stated that collateral estoppel would bar a
forfeiture under § 1497 of the Tariff Act if, in the earlier criminal proceeding, the elements
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The dissent argued that the majority took the statement out of context
because the One Lot Court also stated that the difference in the burdens
of proof in civil and criminal proceedings is an independent ground bar-
ring the application of collateral estoppel. 3 The silence of the majority
on the burden of proof issue implies that the majority adopted the view
of the Coffey Court. The Coffey Court expressly noted and then disre-
garded the different standards of proof argument because in the Court's
view the forfeiture statute was punitive. 4 The Coffey Court found that
the facts litigated in the criminal trial were the basis for the statutory
punishment imposed by the forfeiture, which substantially amounted to
another criminal trial.5 Therefore, since the double jeopardy clause pro-
hibits successive punishments for the same offense, the Coffey Court
barred the civil suit.
Without overruling Coffey, the Supreme Court reiterated the
burden of proof rule57 in Helvering v. Mitchell,8 but clarified the distinc-
tion between civil penalties and criminal penalties. Coffey did not apply
in the Mitchell case because the Mitchell Court construed the tax penalty
as a civil administrative action.5 Congress imposed civil remedial
penalties to protect the government from financial loss, whereas Con-
of a § 1497 forfeiture had been resolved against the government. One Lot Emerald Cut
Stones and One Ring v. United States, 409 U.S. 232, 234 (1972) (footnotes omitted).
669 F.2d 206, 212 n.3 (Winter, C.J., dissenting); see supra note 45 (although defendant
not guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, defendant may be liable by preponderance of the
evidence).
Coffey v. United States, 116 U.S. 436, 443 (1886).
SId.
Id.; see Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 397-99 (1938); United States v. Benz, 282
U.S. 304, 307-09 (1931); supra note 11, 13 (discussion of double jeopardy collateral estoppel
principle).
17 See supra note 45, text accompanying notes 53-54 (difference in burden of proof in
civil and criminal proceedings).
303 U.S. 391, 397 (1938).
" Id. at 405-06. The Mitchell Court evaluated a 50% tax penalty as a civil ad-
ministrative sanction, remedial in nature, to provide indemnity for the government's loss.
Id. at 401, 406. Double jeopardy principles did not bar imposition of the civil penalty for the
civil offense of tax fraud following defendant's acquittal on the criminal charge of wilful tax
evasion. Id. at 406. The Mitchell Court relied upon the Court's previous holdings in Murphy
v. United States and Stone v. United States. Id. at 397; see Murphy v. United States, 272
U.S. 630, 631-32 (1926) (civil action to abate nuisance subsequent to defendant's acquittal on
criminal charge of causing nuisance held remedial as matter of future prevention, not
punitive sanction); Stone v. United States, 167 U.S. 178, 186-87 (1897) (holding that Coffey
did not prevent subsequent civil action when purpose of civil action to reimburse govern-
ment for lost timber); supra note 3 (remedial penalties). The Mitchell Court did not decide
whether the elements of the criminal offense of wilful tax evasion were identical to the
elements of the civil offense of tax fraud. 303 U.S. at 398; see Tomlinson v. Lefkowitz, 334
F.2d 262, 265, 14 A.F.T.R.2d 5169, 5171 (5th Cir. 1964) (fraud necessary element in criminal
conviction for tax evasion).




gress imposed criminal penalties to vindicate public justice by punishing
wrongdoers. 1 The Mitchell Court held that imposition of remedial
penalties in a civil action following an acquittal on the criminal offense
did not violate the double jeopardy rule.2 The Court stated, however,
that if Congress intended the sanction as punishment, so that the civil
proceeding is essentially criminal, the double jeopardy clause would ap-
ply.' As a result of the Mitchell decision, courts explain the Coffey decis-
ion on the basis of double jeopardy principles prohibiting successive
punishments." In Ashe v. Swenson, the Supreme Court cited the Coffey
"' 303 U.S. at 401; see supra notes 1 (Congress may impose civil and criminal sanctions)
& 8 (distinction between remedial and punitive penalties).
" 303 U.S. at 406; see Johnson v. Wall, 329 F.2d 149, 151 (4th Cir. 1964) (collection of
tax on distilled spirits remedial because tax imposed on commodity irrespective of legality
of commodity's origin; therefore, collection may follow acquittal on criminal charge of con-
spiracy to violate internal revenue laws relating to distilled spirits).
6 303 U.S. at 398; see United States v. La Franca, 282 U.S. 568, 575 (1931) (conviction
for violation of National Prohibition Act bars civil action for taxes on illegal activity when
taxes construed as additional punishment); Coffey v. United States, 116 U.S. 436, 443 (1886)
(acquittal of criminal violation bars imposition of punitive forfeiture); supra text at notes
29-35 (discussion of Coffey); supra note 7 (punitive forfeitures).
" United States v. One Lot Emerald Cut Stones and One Ring, 461 F.2d 1189,1191 (5th
Cir.), afrd, 409 U.S. 232 (1972). Courts have questioned the continued validity of the Coffey
decision in light of the holding in Helvering v. Mitchell that double jeopardy does not bar
imposition of a civil remedial penalty after acquittal on a criminal charge for the same con-
duct. Bramble v. Richardson, 498 F.2d 968, 971 (10th Cir.) (forfeiture actions not criminal for
all procedural purposes), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1069 (1974); see United States v. Burch, 294
F.2d 1, 3 (5th Cir. 1961) (acquittal on charge of conspiracy not preclude civil forfeiture
because issues differ); United States v. 38 Cases, 99 F. Supp. 460, 462 (S.D.N.Y. 1951) (Coffey
decision does not bar confiscation of misbranded edible oil); United States v. One De Soto
Sedan, 85 F. Supp. 245, 248 (E.D.N.C. 1949) (acquittal of possession of illegal spirits bars civil
action to forfeit automobile used in offense), affd, 180 F.2d 583 (4th Cir. 1950) (per curiam); 1
MOORE, supra note 11, 0.41813] (debate over whether Coffey decided upon res judicata or
collateral estoppel principles). The District Court in North Carolina in One De Soto reasoned
that the Supreme Court did not overrule Coffey in Mitchell because in Mitchell the parties
did not litigate the same issues so that res judicata did not apply. 85 F. Supp. at 248; see
Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 398 (1938). Also, the difference in the degree of proof
precluded application of res judicata. 85 F. Supp. at 248; see Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S.
at 397. The One De Soto court said that, had the penalty in Mitchell been punitive, the
Mitchell Court would have recognized the double jeopardy problem. 85 F. Supp. at 248; see
Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. at 398.
In United States v. Burch, the Fifth Circuit acknowledged that the punitive or
remedial nature of a forfeiture determined whether the Coffey doctrine applied to bar a
forfeiture imposed by the Internal Revenue laws. United States v. Burch, 294 F.2d 1, 2-3
(5th Cir. 1961). The Burch court said that Coffey was difficult to reconcile with Mitchell on
the issue of the difference in the burden of proof in applying res judicata. Id. at 3. On the
theory that Coffey propounded double jeopardy principles prohibiting successive
punishments, the Burch court sought to determine the nature of the forfeiture of sugar used
in making illegal whiskey. Id. Although the Supreme Court in Mitchell distinguished Coffey
without overruling the decision, the Tenth Circuit in Bramble v. Richardson said that
courts continued to uphold forfeitures in the most inequitable circumstances. 498 F.2d at
971; see Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 690 (1974) (forfeiture of
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opinion with approval as an example of the use of collateral estoppel in
the context of a civil action following a criminal action despite the dif-
ference in the burden of proof. 5 The Ashe Court indicated that the
burden of proof disparity was a technicality that should not obstruct
broad application of collateral estoppel as a safeguard against double
jeopardy." Because the Supreme Court has never overruled Coffey and
in the One Lot footnote explicitly recognized Coffey's continued ap-
plicability, courts must disregard the difference in the standards of proof
in civil and criminal actions and apply collateral estoppel when the
elements of the civil and criminal actions are identical and the purpose of
the civil penalty is punishment. 7
Essential to the 89 Firearms application of the collateral estoppel
double jeopardy doctrine was the Fourth Circuit's decision that the
forfeiture under section 924(d) is criminal in nature. The Fourth Circuit
relied upon the Supreme Court's conclusion in Boyd v. United States 9
that a nominally civil action to forfeit property because of criminal of-
fenses the owner committed was in reality criminal.0 Also, the 89
Firearms court reasoned that the firearms forfeiture is a punishment for
a criminal act because the provision is in the penalties section of the Gun
yacht transporting marijuana) (discussed supra note 7); United States v. One Ford Coupe
Automobile, 272 U.S. 321, 325 (1926) (owner innocent of criminal wrongdoing); supra note 7
(punitive forfeitures). Accord United States v. Burch, 294 F.2d 1, 4-5 (5th Cir. 1961).
Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 443 n.7 (1970).
66 Id. In Ashe, the Supreme Court said that a former judgment in a criminal case could
bar relitigation of issues in a civil case even though the criminal judgment may reflect the
belief that the government had not met the higher burden of proof exacted in criminal
cases. Id. (quoting United States v. Kramer, 289 F.2d 909, 913 (2nd Cir. 1961)). The Kramer
opinion cited Coffey for the principle that a criminal judgment estops a subsequent civil ac-
tion. 289 F.2d at 913; see Coffey v. United States, 116 U.S. 436, 443 (1886).
', Coffey v. United States, 116 U.S. 436, 443 (1886); see United States v. One 1956 Ford
Fairlane, 272 F.2d 705, 706 (10th Cir. 1959). In a footnote to the One Lot opinion, the
Supreme Court cited Coffey for the proposition that a prior acquittal bars a forfeiture when
all the elements are identical in the criminal action and the forfeiture. One Lot Emerald Cut
Stones and One Ring v. United States, 409 U.S. 232, 235 n.5 (1972).
" 685 F.2d at 918. Since the offenses in the Gun Control Act under § 922(a) and § 924(d)
are different because the former is an action against the person and the latter is an action
against the property, the rule of double jeopardy does not apply. See supra note 11 (civil
and criminal offenses separate causes of action, therefore, double jeopardy inapplicable).
The collateral estoppel rule of double jeopardy does apply, however, because the parties
must litigate identical factual issues in each proceeding to impose a criminal punishment.
685 F.2d at 917; see Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 443, 445-46 (1970) (double jeopardy en-
compasses collateral estoppel); supra notes 11-14 (double jeopardy).
" 116 U.S. 616 (1886). In Boyd, the United States sought forfeiture of items brought into
the United States without declaration to customs. Id. at 617. The Court held that the
forfeiture was quasi-criminal because the object of the forfeiture was to penalize offenses
committed by the owner of the property. Id. at 633, 634; see infra text accompanying notes
97-101 (constitutional rights in civil proceedings).
,0 685 F.2d at 918.
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Control Act."' The court stated that the firearms forfeiture is an addi-
tional penalty that disposes of firearms after a conviction for a violation
of the Act."2 The court concluded that Helvering v. Mitchell did not
govern 89 Firearms because the civil monetary penalties for tax fraud in
Mitchell reimburses the government for loss while the government
simply destroys seized firearms.7 The dissent, on the other hand,
asserted that the forfeiture is remedial in nature because the provision
aids in the enforcement of gun control laws by preventing circulation of
illegally obtained firearms.74 However, since the government did not
charge the defendant with dealing in stolen goods, the regulatory pur-
l1 Id. at 918; see 18 U.S.C. § 924 (1976). Chapter 44 of the Criminal Code, the Gun Con-
trol Act, generally proscribes certain activities in commercial business in firearms. §§ 921-
928 (1976). The Act requires licensing and record-keeping by dealers in firearms. Id. Section
924 provides fine and imprisonment for violations of the Act as well as forfeiture of
firearms. Id. § 924. Provision of a penalty in the Criminal Code is indicative of congressional
intent to create a punitive sanction. See One Lot Emerald Cut Stones and One Ring v.
United States, 409 U.S. 232, 237 (1972); Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 404 (1938); infra
notes 80-85 and accompanying text (statutory construction determines congressional intent
to provide remedial or punitive sanctions).
" 685 F.2d at 917; see infra text accompanying notes 93-95 (§ 924(d) of the Gun Control
Act as additional penalty).
" 685 F.2d at 918; see United States v. One De Soto Sedan, 85 F. Supp. 245, 248 (E.D.
N.C. 1949) (forfeiture punitive when value of forfeited property unrelated to taxes govern-
ment lost), affd, 180 F.2d 583 (4th Cir. 1950) (per curiam); see also cases cited infra note 92
(punitive firearms forfeitures). The Fourth Circuit previously followed the Coffey doctrine
to bar forfeiture of an automobile allegedly used in violation of liquor laws after the owner-
driver was acquitted of possession of two gallons of distilled spirits. United States v. One
De Soto Sedan, 85 F. Supp. 245, 245-46 (E.D.N.C. 1949); see, e.g., Inman v. United States, 151
F. Supp. 784, 786 (W.D.S.C. 1957) (previous acquittal on charge of illegally distilling mash
barred civil suit assessing tax as penalty for possession of mash). The One De Soto court
noted that Coffey had received unfavorable press, but the court held that the issue of
possession of distilled spirits had been determined against the government and was con-
clusive. 85 F. Supp. at 248; see supra note 67 (Coffey criticized). Seventy years after the Cof-
fey decision, the Fourth Circuit said that Helvering v. Mitchell had seriously impaired the
authority in Coffey, but that the Supreme Court had not overruled Coffey. United States v.
One 1953 Oldsmobile 98 4 Door Sedan, 222 F.2d 668, 670-71 (4th Cir. 1955). Since the claimant
of the car and the defendant in the criminal action were different parties in One 1953
Oldsmobile, the court held that the Coffey rule did not apply. Id. at 673; accord United
States v. One 1935 Model Pontiac Sedan, 105 F.2d 149, 150 (6th Cir. 1939) (Coffey not con-
trolling when parties to actions different).
The Fourth Circuit has followed Mitchell, however, in holding that civil penalties are
remedial and not within Coffey. See United States v. Mumford, 630 F.2d 1023, 1027 (4th Cir.
1980) (civil injunction to prevent future activity not punishment for past acts), cert. denied,
450 U.S. 1041 (1981); Northern Virginia Women's Medical Center v. Balch, 617 F.2d 1045,
1059 (4th Cir. 1980) (acquittal on criminal charge does not preclude civil injunction against
tortfeasor); Moore v. United States, 360 F.2d 353, 357-58, 16 A.F.T.R. 2d 6058, 6061 (4th Cir.
1965) (civil proceeding for tax liability following criminal conviction for tax evasion), cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 1001 (1967); Johnson v. Wall, 329 F.2d 149, 151 (4th Cir. 1964) (collection of
IRS taxes remedial, rejecting Coffey argument).
" 669 F.2d at 212 (Winter, C.J., dissenting).
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pose of the forfeiture proposed by the dissent was inapplicable to the of-
fense of unlicensed dealing in 89 Firearms.5 The 89 Firearms majority
ruled that firearms become contraband subject to seizure only when a
person uses the firearms in violation of the Gun Control Act, while goods
undeclared to customs as in One Lot become contraband without regard
to the guilt or innocence of the owner."
The 89 Firearms dissent also asserted that because an in rem
forfeiture is remedial in nature, double jeopardy does not apply.77 The
dissent relied upon cases holding that a section 924(d) action is a civil
proceeding requiring proof of each element of the offense by a
preponderance of the evidence, and, therefore, is remedial.78 The
" See Appellee Brief, supra note 21, at 3 (defendant indicted under § 922(a)(1) for viola-
tion of the Gun Control Act).
28 685 F.2d at 916. The Fourth Circuit distinguished One Lot from 89 Firearms
because criminal intent was not necessary to prove the stones in One Lot were contraband,
but an offense on the part of the owner of the firearms was necessary to subject the
firearms to forfeiture in 89 Firearms. Id.; but see supra text accompanying notes 48-50 (89
Firearms dissent assertion that § 924(d) of Gun Control Act includes element of intent not
present in criminal statute).
In One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, the Supreme Court distinguished be-
tween malum. in se property that can have no lawful use and is harmful to the public and
property that is derivative contraband. 380 U.S. 693, 699 (1965). Derivative contraband ac-
quires illegality through illegal use, but mere possession of contraband per se is a crime.
Note, Commonwealth v. One 1958 Plymouth Sedan: Search and Seizure in Forfeiture Pro-
ceedings for Liquor Law Violations, 69 DICK. L. REv. 284, 291 (1965) [hereinafter cited as
DICKINSON Note]; Smith, supra note 5, at 661-62 (derivative contraband); Note, Statutory
Forfeitures-Extension of the Exclusionary Rule to Civil Actions, 40 TUL. L. REv. 672, 677
(1966) (malum in se and derivative contraband) [hereinafter cited as TULANE Note].
Firearms are not contraband per se. McKeehan v. United States, 438 F.2d 739, 744 (6th Cir.
1971). Congress, however, expanded the definition of contraband articles as the property
relates to narcotics so that law enforcement officials may seize and force forfeiture of
automobiles, aircraft, or vessels belonging to criminals. H.R. REP. No. 2751, 81st Cong., 2d
Sess., reprinted in 1950 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2952; see Calero-Toledo v. Pearson
Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 668 (1974) (forfeiture of innocent owner's yacht for
transporting marijuana cigarette); supra note 7 (discussion of Calero-Toledo); infra note 103
(same); see also Comment, Rendering Illegal Behavior Unprofitable: Vehicle Forfeiture
Under the Uniform Controlled Substances Act, 8 CREIGHTON L. REv. 471, 474-76 (1974);
Levin, supra note 7, at 1051-54 (discussing Calero-Toledo); Note, Forfeiture of Property Used
in Illegal Acts, 38 NOTRE DAME LAw 727, 735 (1963). Administrative procedures complement
some forfeiture statutes to permit innocent owners to reclaim the seized property. See
Doherty v. United States, 500 F.2d 540, 544-45 (Ct. Cl. 1974) (defendant convicted of smug-
gling marijuana had 60 days to petition for remission of seized items); United States v. One
1969 Plymouth Fury, 476 F.2d 960, 961 (5th Cir. 1973) (remission denied holder of security
interest in automobile transporting counterfeit federal reserve note), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
838 (1975); 19 U.S.C. § 1618 (1980). The Gun Control Act does not provide any administrative
redress for innocent owners of firearms. 685 F.2d at 918; see United States v. One Assort-
ment of Firearms and Ammunition, 313 F. Supp. 1056, 1059 (E.D. Tenn. 1970) (no mitigation
for firearms forfeiture).
685 F.2d at 919; 669 F.2d at 212 (Winter, C.J., dissenting).
78 669 F.2d at 212 (Winter, C.J., dissenting). The 89 Firearms dissent relied upon Glup
v. United States and Epps v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms in asserting that the
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Supreme Court, however, has rejected the use of the form of the pro-
ceeding to determine the punitive or remedial nature of the sanction im-
posed. 9
forfeiture under § 924(d) of the Gun Control Act is remedial and not punitive. Id.; see Glup
v. United States, 523 F.2d 557, 561 (8th Cir. 1975); Epps v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and
Firearms, 375 F. Supp. 345, 346 (E.D. Tenn. 1973), affd, 495 F.2d 1373 (6th Cir. 1974). In
Glup, the Eighth Circuit held that the forfeiture under § 924(d) is remedial in nature
because the appropriate burden of proof is a preponderance of the evidence. 523 F.2d 557,
561. In reviewing One Lot, the Eighth Circuit emphasized the difference in the burden of
proof between a civil and a criminal action as a bar to the application of collateral estoppel.
Id. The Eighth Circuit ignored the difference in the issues between the criminal charge of
smuggling and the forfeiture of undeclared goods in One Lot. Id. In One Lot, the element of
criminal intent was present in the smuggling charge and not in the forfeiture. One Lot
Emerald Cut Stones and One Ring v. United States, 409 U.S. 232, 234-35. The difference in
the issues distinguished One Lot from Coffey. Id. at 235 n.5; see supra note 44, 47-51
(distinguishing One Lot from 89 Firearms and Coffey). The Glup court also rejected the
view of the Tenth Circuit in Lowther v. United States that firearms seized pursuant to
violations of the Internal Revenue laws are not subject to forfeiture except upon proof of a
criminal violation to condemn the property. 523 F.2d at 561; see Lowther v. United States,
480 F.2d 1031, 1033 (10th Cir. 1973) (acquittal of defendant for illegal possession of military
weapons was adjudication of defendant's right to possess weapons, thus, forfeiture of same
weapons violates fifth amendment prohibition against taking without just compensation).
The Epps court held that a forfeiture under § 924(d) of the Gun Control Act was a civil
remedial sanction by the government. Epps v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms,
375 F. Supp. 345, 346 (E.D. Tenn. 1973); see 18 U.S.C. § 924(d) (1976). The Epps court relied
upon the holding in Helvering v. Mitchell that a civil administrative sanction is remedial in
nature. Id.; see Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 401 (1938). In Epps, the government
forfeited the firearms administratively because the defendant did not post a bond requiring
the government to proceed to condemn the firearms in a judicial in rem action. Id. at 349..
Therefore, the Epps court did not address the issue of a subsequent judicial proceeding
with double jeopardy implications. See 685 F.2d at 917; supra text accompanying notes 58-64
(discussion of Mitchell) and infra notes 86-88 (Mitchell test for remedial sanctions). But see
infra note 92 (courts holding firearms forfeitures punitive).
The dissent in 89 Firearms also proposed that the additional noncriminal behavior that
the forfeiture sanctioned is conclusive of the remedial nature of the statute. 685 F.2d at 919
note * (Winter, C.J., dissenting); see supra text accompanying notes 48-50 (dissent assertion
that intent is element of § 924(d) forfeiture).
71 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 94-95 (1958) (allowing statutory form to determine
whether penalty was civil or criminal would be simplistic approach to evaluating constitu-
tional rights). Although Congress provided a civil proceeding and stated a preventive pur-
pose for disqualifying members of the Communist party from holding union office, the
Supreme Court in United States v. Brown held that the sanction was punitive and un-
constitutional. 381 U.S. 437, 454 (1965). In Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, the Supreme
Court construed a civil statute expatriating a citizen who left or remained outside the
United States to evade military service as a penal provision without a regulatory purpose.
371 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963). In Afroyim v. Rusk, the Court overruled an earlier decision and
held that a civil regulatory penalty expatriating a citizen for voting in a foreign election was
unconstitutional. 387 U.S. 253, 268 (1967), overruling, Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 58, 62
(1958); see Clark, supra note 2, at 390-91 (no coherent explanation by Supreme Court as to
punitive-remedial distinction in disability penalties); Levin, supra note 7, at 1020-27
(criticism of Supreme Court's punitive-regulatory decisions); INDIANA Note, supra note 2
(analysis of punitive-regulatory nature of disability burdens).
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In Mitchell and One Lot, the Supreme Court required courts to
engage in statutory construction to determine whether Congress intended
to impose a remedial or punitive sanction. 0 The Mitchell Court ascer-
tained that a tax penalty was remedial for several reasons." First, an ad-
ministrative agency could enforce the penalty without the necessity of
invoking judicial power.2 Second, the statute contained criminal
penalties and also provided for collection of interest and additional
amounts of tax. 3 Third, the purpose of the penalty was compensation for
the government's loss. 4 In One Lot, the Court found that a separate
statutory scheme established congressional intent to provide a remedial
forfeiture and a punitive forfeiture.85 In Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez,
the Supreme Court set forth additional factors to aid in determining the
punitive or remedial nature of a civil penalty in the absence of conclusive
evidence of congressional intent.8 If the behavior to which the civil sanc-
tion applies is already a crime, if the aim is deterrence, if the forfeiture
80 One Lot Emerald Cut Stones and One Ring v. United States, 409 U.S. 232, 237 (1972);
Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 399 (1938).
"I 303 U.S. at 399.
82 Id. at 401-02. The Mitchell Court said that collection of a criminal monetary penalty
by a civil administrative agency would be unconstitutional because civil proceedings do not
provide the constitutional safeguards necessary for criminal prosecutions. Id.; see Lipke v.
Lederer, 259 U.S. 557, 560-61 (1922) (tax administratively assessed against illegal manu-
facturers of liquor held punitive and invalid).
" 303 U.S. at 404-05. In Mitchell, the Revenue Act of 1928 contained a penalties sec-
tion as well as the interest and additions section for assessment and collections necessary to
the administrative agency. Id. The fact that the Revenue Act contained two separate and
distinct provisions imposing sanctions indicated to the Mitchell Court that Congress intended
to punish wilful violators criminally and to collect additional money for noncriminal failure
to pay as indemnity for the expense of assessment and collection. Id. at 401, 404-05.
, 303 U.S. at 401; see supra note 4 (monetary remedial penalties).
One Lot Emerald Cut Stones and One Ring v. United States, 409 U.S. 232, 237 (1972).
The One Lot Court found that § 545 of the Criminal Code of the United States prohibits
smuggling and imposes imprisonment, fine and forfeiture of undeclared goods. Id.; see 18
U.S.C. § 545 (1976). Section 1497 in the Administrative Provisions of the Tariff Act provides
forfeiture of undeclared goods as a remedial sanction to prevent forbidden items from cir-
culating in the United States without regard to the criminal involvement of the owner. 409
U.S. at 237; see 19 U.S.C. § 1497 (1976).
372 U.S. 144, 175 (1963). In Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, the Supreme Court set
forth seven tests to aid in determining the punitive or remedial nature of a civil penalty. Id.
at 168-69. The relevant inquiry is whether the sanction involves affirmative disabilities,
whether the sanction historically has been a punishment, whether the statute requires
scienter or guilty intent to prove the civil penalty, whether the aim of the penalty is retribu-
tion and deterrence, whether the sanction applies to an act that is already a crime, and
whether the penalty could have any regulatory purpose. Id. (discussed supra note 84); see
United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 249-50 (1980) (discharge of hazardous waste criminal of-
fense, but Congress intended civil remedial penalty); United States v. Firestone Tire & Rub-
ber, 518 F. Supp. 1021, 1035-36 (N.D. Ohio 1981) (penalty for violation of Gold Act civil
because Congress also provided criminal sanction for same conduct); United States v.
Alcatex, Inc., 328 F. Supp. 129, 133 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (confiscation of illegal imported silk to
compensate government for expenses); Levin, supra note 7, at 1046-54 (Mendoza-Martinez
abandoned in forfeiture cases); INDIANA Note, supra note 2, at 279-88 (attempts to classify
penalties as remedial or punitive).
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appears excessive, and if no rational regulatory purpose is apparent, the
sanction is punitive."' Regulatory penalties intended to shape the con-
duct of citizens, rather than raise revenue, are criminal burdens.88
The Fourth Circuit opinion in 89 Firearms is consistent with the
Supreme Court tests because the firearms forfeiture has the foregoing
aspects of a punitive sanction. Section 924(d) requires a judicial decision
and criminal involvement by the person in possession of the firearms.
Firearms subject to destruction cannot restore lost license fees to the
government or compensate for the costs of investigating crime."0 In sec-
tion 924, the penalties section of the Gun Control Act, Congress provided
an enforcement scheme composed of fine, imprisonment, and forfeiture
similar to section 545 of the Criminal Code prohibiting and punishing
smuggling which the Supreme Court analyzed in One Lot.9' Accordingly,
Congress intended section 924(d), the forfeiture section to be a punitive
measure against a person even though the form of the forfeiture action
is a civil proceeding."
The Fourth Circuit reasoned that the forfeiture is an additional
penalty that merely disposes of firearms after a conviction for violation
372 U.S. at 175.
Rodgers v. United States, 332 U.S. 371, 375 (1947). The Rodgers Court held that the
purpose of a tax imposed on farmers for noncompliance with acreage limitations was to in-
fluence the conduct of farmers, not to raise revenue. Id. The tax upon farmers was a penalty
because the tax forced compliance with the policy to control agricultural production. Id.
11 685 F.2d at 917-18.
0 Id. at 917.
1' Id. at 917-18; see supra text accompanying notes 83, 85 (statutory scheme of Mitchell
and One Lot). Courts have held that provision for sanctions in a criminal section and a civil
administrative section is conclusive of congressional intent to punish wrongdoers and to
regulate activity or indemnify the government. See United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242,
249-50 (1980) (separate civil and criminal penalties within same statute); United States v.
Two Hundred Fifty-Four United States Twenty Dollar Gold Coins, 355 F. Supp. 298, 302
(E.D. Mich. 1973) (criminal penalty punishes smuggling and civil forfeiture provides means
to enforce Gold Act of 1934 pursuant to congressional power to regulate currency of U.S.).
The Gun Control Act has only one forfeiture statute in the Penalties section. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(d) (1976). Arguably, Congress intended the forfeiture to be a civil regulatory penalty
to deny possession of potentially dangerous weapons to persons who would abuse or
disregard the highly regulated area of commercial interstate firearms activity. See infra
note 95 (proposing a theory for remedial firearms forfeitures).
' 685 F.2d at 918. The 89 Firearms court held that Congress did not intend to provide
a criminal and a civil remedy for violation of the Gun Control Act. Id.; see supra notes 40, 91
(civil and criminal penalties in One Lot). Confiscation of firearms stock is excessive and
punitive. United States v. 1,922 Assorted Firearms, 330 F. Supp. 635, 642 (E.D. Mo. 1971)
(four illegal sales do not justify taking all firearms stock). Cf. Lowther v. United States, 480
F.2d 1031, 1033 (10th Cir. 1973) (forfeiture of firearms under Internal Revenue laws im-
proper when owner not involved in criminal activities); McKeehan v. United States, 438
F.2d 739, 745 (6th Cir. 1971) (forfeiture of unregistered World War II machine guns in
absence of owner's criminal acts serves no administrative or remedial purpose and does not
aid enforcement of criminal laws); Compton v. United States, 377 F.2d 408, 412 (8th Cir.
1967) (trial court surmised that jury had not returned verdict resulting in forfeiture of truck
of substantial value because small amount of liquor involved in violation of Internal
Revenue laws); supra note 78 (Glup court held Lowther not binding on § 924(d) forfeiture).
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of the Gun Control Act." The Fourth Circuit's interpretation of section
924(d) of the Act implies that the firearms forfeiture is a penalty imposed
only after a conviction of a criminal offense proved beyond a reasonable
doubt, when, in fact, a court may order forfeiture in a single proceeding
upon proof by a preponderance of the evidence. 4 The historical accept-
ance of the civil forfeiture alone as a preventive measure against illegal
trafficking of firearms in commerce may have caused the split in the 89
Firearms court, although neither the majority nor the dissent offerred a
remedial or regulatory purpose for confiscation of firearms of unlicensed
dealers. 95
The Fourth Circuit's analysis of the punitive nature of the firearms
forfeiture points up the inconsistency of the punishment theory in the
9 685 F.2d at 917-18.
9' See United States v. 10 Firearms and 24 Rounds of Ammunition, 444 F. Supp. 305,
307 (N.D. Tex. 1977) (forfeiture action although grand jury refused to indict on criminal of-
fense); United States v. One Assortment of 12 Rifles and 21 Handguns, 313 F. Supp. 641, 642
(N.D. Fla. 1970) (isolated sales insufficient to convict on criminal offense under Gun Control
Act, but sufficient for § 924(d) forfeiture).
95 18 U.S.C. § 924(d) (1976); see supra text accompanying notes 68-73 (89 Firearms ma-
jority holds § 924(d) forfeiture punitive), 74-75 (89 Firearms dissent asserts confiscation of
stolen firearms regulatory sanction) and 93-94 (firearms forfeited without criminal convic-
tion). Forfeitures of property are preventative because the threat of confiscation of prop-
erty in a civil proceeding may outweigh the deterrent effect of possible punishment in a
criminal proceeding. TEMPLE Note, supra note 5, at 193. In upholding the civil forfeiture in
Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., the Supreme Court stated that the forfeiture
of conveyances used in violation of narcotics laws fosters the underlying purposes of the
criminal statutes by imposing an economic penalty that renders illegal behavior un-
profitable. 416 U.S. 663, 686-87 (1974); see supra note 7 (discussing Calero-Toledo). The
Supreme Court implied that courts may justify the remedial nature of a civil sanction that
punishes conduct on the basis that the civil penalty has a rational relationship to the en-
forcement of criminal statutes. Levin, supra note 7, at 1052. When Congress has broad
authority to regulate in areas involving interstate commerce and foreign affairs, civil
remedial sanctions may deter individual conduct as long as an alternative regulatory func-
tion exists that is rationally related to the purpose of the underlying criminal statute. Flem-
ming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 615-17 (1960) (mere denial of noncontractual benefit of Social
Security regulatory and nonpunitive); see supra note 79 (punitive-regulatory disability sanc-
tions); infra note 100 (civil penalties to deter conduct). Arguably, Congress, therefore, did in-
tend the firearms forfeiture in § 924(d) to be a preventative or regulatory sanction.
Although the forfeiture of firearms is not a traditional remedial penalty that compensates
the government for enforcement expenses, the sanction supports efforts to enforce laws ap-
plicable to a commercial enterprise involving goods potentially dangerous to the public and
useful to criminals. See Gun Control Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-618, § 101, 82 Stat. 1213-14
(1968) (stating purpose of Act).
The Gun Control Act aids in the prevention and investigation of crime by requiring
licensing of persons and record-keeping for the business of selling firearms in interstate
commerce. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 922-923 (1976). The proper purpose of the forfeiture of firearms
is to keep potentially dangerous weapons out of the hands of unlicensed dealers. United
States v. 16,179 Moslo Italian .22 Caliber Winlee Derringer Convertible Starter Guns, 443
F.2d 463, 466 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 983 (1971); United States v. 57 Miscellaneous
Firearms, 422 F. Supp. 1066, 1070 (W.D. Mo. 1976). Removing firearms available to a person
without the proper qualifications to deal in firearms prevents future forbidden activity. See
Murphy v. United States, 272 U.S. 630, 631-32 (1926) (action to abate nuisance remedial
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context of an in rem proceeding.9 6 In some quasi-criminal civil proceed-
ings, the Supreme Court has held that certain constitutional rights such
as the protection against self-incrimination and the prohibition against
unreasonable search and seizure that are available to criminal defendants
must be available to civil defendants.97 But the Court has provided dou-
ble jeopardy protection only for forfeitures that are clearly punitive, not
for loss of property through forfeitures per se." The Supreme Court con-
sidered but did not decide whether the due process clause of the United
States Constitution requires the right to counsel when deprivations or
because action involves future prevention); Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S. 189, 200 (1898)
(delicensure of doctor not punitive, but regulatory because sanction enforces standard of
conduct). The noncriminal conduct of intending to use a firearm in violation of the Act is
analogous to a lesser included offense in the criminal violations of the Act, and, thus, the
less serious economic penalty of a forfeiture results. See Tomlinson v. Lefkowitz, 334 F.2d
262, 265, 14 A.F.T.R.2d 5169, 5171 (5th Cir. 1964) (fraud necessary element in criminal con-
viction for tax evasion, taxpayer estopped from contesting fraud in civil suit for additional
tax penalty); Levin, supra note 7, at 1048 (One Lot forfeiture lesser included offense).
Although punitive to the owner, a firearms forfeiture is rationally related to enforcement of
commercial traffic in dangerous weapons.
" See Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 402 (1938). The Mitchell Court stated that a
civil procedure is incompatible with the accepted rules and constitutional guarantees govern-
ing the trial of criminal prosecutions. Id.; see United States v. United States Coin & Cur-
rency, 401 U.S. 715, 721-22 (1971) (forfeiture of money seized in illegal bookmaking operation
intended to impose penalty upon individuals significantly involved in criminal enterprise);
infra note 97 (constitutional safeguards in forfeiture actions. Contra Calero-Toledo v. Pear-
son Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663 (1974) (discussed supra note 7).
1 See United States v. United States Coin & Currency, 401 U.S. 715, 721-22 (1971)
(privilege against self-incrimination); One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S.
693, 702 (1965) (search and seizure protection); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 625-35
(1886) (search and seizure and self-incrimination protections); see also U.S. CONST. amend. IV
(right against unreasonable search and seizure); U.S. CONST. amend. V. (no person shall be
compelled in criminal cases to be witness against himself). Boyd, One Plymouth Sedan, and
United States Coin and Currency do not transform forfeiture proceedings into criminal ac-
tions for all procedural purposes. See Bramble v. Richardson, 498 F.2d 968, 973 (10th Cir.)
(fifth amendment due process clause requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt not ap-
plicable in forfeiture action confiscating automobile seized in violation of narcotics laws),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1069 (1974); see Clark, supra note 1, at 394-95 (Supreme Court never
adequately explained inconsistent application of constitutional protections to forfeitures);
see generally DICKINSON Note, supra note 76 (search and seizure in forfeiture proceedings);
TULANE Note, supra note 76 (exclusionary rule in forfeiture actions); Comment, Criminal
Safeguards and the Punitive Damages Defendant, 34 U. CHI. L. REv. 408 (1967) (asserts
punitive damages in tort suits sufficiently penal in nature to require jury trial and proof
beyond reasonable doubt).
" One Lot Emerald Cut Stones and One Ring v. United States, 409 U.S. 232, 235-36
(1972). The One Lot Court stated that the double jeopardy clause did not apply to a
forfeiture action because neither two criminal trials nor two criminal punishments are in-
volved. Id. The One Lot Court considered Coffey an exception to which double jeopardy did
apply because of the complete identity between the civil and criminal actions and the
seizure of the property in connection with a criminal action. Id. at 234-35. The Supreme
Court upheld confiscation of vehicles, aircraft and yachts conveying narcotics in civil pro-
ceedings. Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 687-88 (1974); see supra
note 7 (forfeiture of yacht in violation of narcotics laws); see also Charney, supra note 2, at
485 (double jeopardy); Clark, supra note 2, at 392-96 (double jeopardy clause and forfeitures).
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property rights and interests are of sufficient consequence.9 Congress,
therefore, has been free to impose severe remedial penalties in civil pro-
ceedings.0 0 Defendants in civil actions have few constitutional
safeguards because the penalty technically is neither a fine nor imprison-
ment. 0'
The Fourth Circuit's evaluation of the punitive nature of the
firearms forfeiture is correct. Since firearms are not contraband per
se, ' the forfeiture in 89 Firearms was dependent upon proof of substan-
tial criminal involvement by the person in possession of the stock."3 The
practice of destroying the firearms reveals the total absence of indemni-
fying effect. The dissent failed to establish the preventive or regulatory
purpose of the civil sanction.' A thorough analysis and clarification of
the remedial purpose of the forfeiture would have given the 89 Firearms
decision great precedential value.'
" Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972). The Argersinger Court held that a
defendant has a right to counsel if he faces risk of incarceration. Id. Mr. Justice Powell
stated that the fifth and fourteenth amendments guarantee that the government may not
take property, as well as life and liberty, from a person without due process of law. Id. at 48
(Powell, J., concurring).
"' Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 685 (1974) (upheld as con-
stitutional the severity of forfeitures against property of innocent owners); see United
States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 250-51 (1980) (excessive monetary penalty for oil spill remedial
because penalty provides funds to finance removal of hazardous substances); see also
Charney, supra note 2, at 481 (Congress changing criminal penalties to civil penalties);
Levin, supra note 7, at 1014-20 (initial penalties for violation of Occupational Safety and
Health Act criminal, now civil). In the 1972 amendments to the Intercoastal Shipping Act,
Congress substituted civil penalties to sanction criminal violations of the Act to avoid
cumbersome criminal sanctions. S. REP. No. 1014, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3, reprinted in 1972
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3121, 3122-23; see 46 U.S.C. §§ 814, 815,817, 822,831, 844 (1976)
(amending 46 U.S.C. §§ 814, 815, 817, 822, 831, 844 (1970)); Charney, supra note 2, at 481-82;
see also The Racketeer Influence & Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-
1968 (1976). The primary purpose of RICO is to strengthen the means of preventing money
and power obtained from illegal endeavors from being used to infiltrate and corrupt
legitimate businesses and labor unions, to subvert the democratic processes, to interfere
with free competition and to burden interstate commerce. United States v. Forsythe, 429 F.
Supp. 715, 720 (W.D. Pa.), rev'd on other grounds, 560 F.2d 1127 (3rd Cir. 1977). Section 1963
of RICO provides criminal penalties, including forfeiture of any property interests acquired
as a result of racketeering. 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (1976). Section 1964 of RICO provides civil
penalties that require a person to divest himself of property interests acquired or influenced
by racketeering. 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (1976). Section 1964 should be construed liberally to effect
the section's remedial purpose. United States v. Kaye, 556 F.2d 855, 860 n.7 (7th Cir.), cerL
denied, 434 U.S. 921 (1977). Just as § 924(d) of the Gun Control Act, § 1964 requires
forfeiture of property for noncriminal misconduct. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(d), § 1964 (1976).
' See supra note 5 (forfeiture actions against property, not persons). The property
owner will not suffer a criminal record or the collateral consequence of a criminal conviction.
Levin, supra note 7, at 1053.
10 685 F.2d at 916; see supra note 76 (contraband per se).
103 Id. at 917.
'o' See supra text accompanying notes 74-75, 77-79 (89 Firearms dissent assertion that
§ 924(d) forfeiture is civil remedial sanction).
' See supra note 95 and accompanying text (proposed theory of remedial purpose of §
924(d) of Gun Control Act).
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The Fourth Circuit decision is significant because the Coffey doc-
trine may be the sole limitation on the use of harsh civil penalties designed
by Congress for retribution and deterrence, the traditional ends of
criminal sanctions, as well as for compensatory damages."6 The govern-
ment can assess a civil penalty more easily than a criminal penalty but
should not be able to use civil actions to impose criminal punishment. 7
Also, since the Supreme Court must construe federal statutes to avoid
unconstitutionality, 8 courts. have been reluctant to hold a civil penalty
punitive in nature."' The Coffey doctrine, although narrow, is crucial to
protect citizens against successive trials.10 Since the 89 Firearms ma-
jority held that the forfeiture is an additional penalty for a criminal of-
fense, the decision may have the effect of challenging the right of the
United States government to proceed initially with a civil action, forego-
ing the risk of an acquittal in a criminal trial.1 ' Subjecting the citizen to
only one trial is consistent with the constitutional protection intended
by the double jeopardy clause.'
BONNIE L. PAUL
Ill See supra note 100 (use of civil penalties to deter conduct).
" See Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 166 (1963) (imposition of punish-
ment without procedural safeguards of fifth and sixth amendments invalid); Helvering v.
Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 402 (1938) (civil procedure incompatible with safeguards of criminal
prosecution); Neaderland v. Commissioner, 424 F.2d 639, 641 (2d Cir.) (bundle of legal prin-
ciples in civil and criminal actions not comparable), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 827 (1970); Clark,
supra note 2, at 381 (administrative proceedings streamlined); Levin, supra note 7, at 1018
(difficulty of enforcing criminal penalties).
"' United States v. La Franca, 282 U.S. 568, 574 (1931); see Flemming v. Nestor, 363
U.S. 603, 617 (1960); Murphy v. United States, 272 U.S. 630, 632-33 (1926). The Supreme
Court presumes that legislation passed by Congress is constitutional. 363 U.S. at 617; see
Fletcher v. Peck, 2 U.S. (6 Cranch) 328, 331 (1810). Courts cannot allow implications and con-
jectures to establish the unconstitutionality of a law, but must evaluate the objective
manifestations of congressional intent concerning the law. 363 U.S. at 617.
1 See Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 617 (cancellation of social security benefits to
aliens not punitive); United States v. Burch, 294 F.2d 1, 4 (5th Cir. 1961) (reluctance to apply
Coffey to forfeiture for violation of whiskey laws); United States v. Alcatex, Inc., 328 F.
Supp. 129, 133 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (confiscation of illegally imported silk civil in nature).
11 See supra text accompanying notes 29-35, 54-56 (Coffey doctrine).
I See supra text accompanying notes 93-96 (89 Firearms holding that § 924(d)
forfeiture is an additional penalty for criminal offense). The 89 Firearms holding may re-
quire the government to prove the criminal violation beyond a reasonable doubt prior to im-
position of a forfeiture. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is inconsistent with the require-
ment of the preponderance of the evidence standard in civil trials in which the defendant is
not exposed to imprisonment. See Lilienthal's Tobacco v. United States, 97 U.S. 237, 272
(1877) (charges in in rem forfeiture must be proved satisfactorily, but not according to the
standards of a criminal trial).
' Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 447 (1970). The constitutional guarantee of the fifth
amendment forbids giving the prosection an opportunity for a "dry run" in the first trial to
refine its presentation in a second trial. Id.; see supra text accompanying notes 11-14 (col-
lateral estoppel double jeopardy doctrine).
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